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We investigate in a series of laboratory experiments how costs and
benefits of linguistic communication affect the emergence of
simple languages in a coordination task when no common lan-
guage is available in the beginning. The experiment involved
pairwise computerized communication between 152 subjects in-
volved in at least 60 rounds. The subjects had to develop a common
code referring to items in varying lists of geometrical figures
distinguished by up to three features. A code had to be made of a
limited repertoire of letters. Using letters had a cost. We are
interested in the question of whether a common code is developed,
and what enhances its emergence. Furthermore, we explore the
emergence of compositional, protogrammatical structure in such
codes. We compare environments that differ in terms of available
linguistic resources (number of letters available) and in terms of
stability of the task environment (variability in the set of figures).
Our experiments show that a too small repertoire of letters causes
coordination failures. Cost efficiency and role asymmetry are
important factors enhancing communicative success. In stable
environments, grammars do not seem to matter much, and instead
efficient arbitrary codes often do better. However, in an environ-
ment with novelty, compositional grammars offer considerable
coordination advantages and therefore are more likely to arise.
communication  compositionality  economics of language
According to the linguist Andre´ Martinet, language is shaped‘‘by the permanent conflict between man’s communicative
needs and his tendency to reduce to a minimum his mental and
physical activity’’ (1). This means that the benefits of commu-
nication are compared with the memory and articulation costs
of linguistic expression. A tendency toward the optimization of
the difference between benefits and costs is postulated.
Even if many contemporary linguists would disagree with
Martinet’s view, it is widely recognized that some sort of
economizing principle is at work in shaping human language: for
example, Chomsky’s (2) ‘‘minimalist program’’ relies on assump-
tions of economy of derivation and representation, and on
principles of least effort. However, he maintains that ‘‘questions
concerning abstract computational mechanisms are distinct
from those concerning communication’’ (3). Another interesting
approach to language structure is optimality theory (4), which
postulates a process of constraint satisfaction that guides the
shaping of linguistic outputs.
A recent, growing body of literature has exploited principles
of communication effectiveness and efficiency to model, math-
ematically or by computer simulation, the emergence of gram-
matical languages from initial no communication (5–10). As will
become apparent later, the basic models used in this literature
have some resemblance with the structure of our experiments.
Moreover, we should mention a long tradition of using prin-
ciples of least effort to explain and model language statistical
regularities like Zipf’s law in word distribution (11–13).
There is also a small but growing literature on the economics
of language that relates language structure to cost–benefit
considerations. On the theoretical side, Rubinstein (14) has
shown how optimization considerations can contribute to ex-
plain the properties of binary relations appearing in natural
language. Blume (15) has modeled how learning efficiency is
favored by modularity of language. Weber and Camerer (16)
report an experimental study of the emergence of a common
code based on natural language under efficiency pressure.
The experiments described here try to explore how costs and
benefits of linguistic expression affect the emergence of simple
languages or codes in a coordination task. At the beginning, the
subjects do not yet have a common language; they must therefore
develop it in the course of interaction.
We look at the emergence of languages in an extremely
simplified laboratory environment. We consider only the bene-
fits of transferring meaning correctly and the cost of language
expression. Thus, factors emphasized by sociolinguists (17) are
not present in our experimental setup. This permits us to isolate
the two ‘‘economic’’ factors.
In psycholinguistics, there is a tradition exploring how inter-
acting individuals adapt natural language to coordinate in some
unfamiliar task (18, 19). Weber and Camerer (16) have success-
fully extended such type of experimental design to the investi-
gation of economic issues. Our experiments are different be-
cause our subjects cannot use a natural language but have to
shape an artificial one. This permits us to put more in focus the
emergence of common codes and to explore their structural
properties.
Our experiments are also very different from those that inves-
tigate the acquisition of artificial grammar (20), because our focus
is on the emergence of an artificial language rather than on its
acquisition. Moreover, we do not look at the evolution of linguistic
competence. Of course, all our subjects are already endowed with
this competence. We investigate how simple languages are created
by linguistically competent subjects in a situationwhere no common
language is available in the beginning.
A recent paper by Galantucci (21) explores the emergence of
graphical signs in the environment of a video game that requires
cooperation of two subjects. This paper offers some interesting
insights based mostly on a qualitative discussion of the behavior
of 10 pairs of subjects. Our experiment was developed indepen-
dently and differs in many respects from Galantucci’s. First, our
focus is more on the structure of language rather than the nature
of signs. In our experiments, signs are predefined and have to be
combined. Moreover, our communication protocol is more
constrained, communication is costly (unlike in Galantucci’s
experiment), and the payoff structure is quite different. Finally,
our experiment is based on a much broader sample of subjects,
permitting a deeper statistical analysis.
In our experiments, subjects see a list of geometrical figures on
a computer screen. These figures differ by shape (circle, square,
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etc.), inserts (star, dot, etc.), and sometimes by color. To each of
the figures in the screen, a subject must assign a message, a string
of permissible letters. The subjects interact anonymously in
pairs. They both always face the same list of figures and the same
repertoire of permissible letters. In each period, one subject and
one figure are randomly chosen, and then the message specified
by the code is transmitted to the other player. The transmission
is successful if and only if the messages specified by both codes
are the same. A payoff is obtained for a communication success,
but the letters have costs that must be borne by the sender. After
each period, both players receive feedback on the chosen figure
and the messages specified by the code of the receiver. After
receiving the feedback, they can change their codes.
We are interested in whether a common code is developed,
and what enhances its emergence. We also explore the structure
of common codes, which may or may not have a grammatical
structure. We compare environments that differ with respect to
the size of the repertoire of permissible letters and with respect
to novelty (i.e., the frequency with which new figures occur).
We conducted four versions of our experiment. The rules
apply to all of them. The versions differ with respect to the
figures presented and the repertoire of permissible letters and
their costs. All experiments begin with a small number of figures
and small repertoires (two or three figures and the same number
of letters). The set of figures and the repertoire of letters expand
over time in different ways.
Fig. 1 gives an overview of the four versions of our experiment
(referred to as experiments I, II, III, and IV). It shows which
figures were presented in which periods and which repertoire of
letters was available. We use the name ‘‘block’’ for a section of
an experiment in which figures and repertoire of letters remain
unchanged. Each of the experiments I and II had only one
session of 60 periods. In experiments III and IV, the participants
stayed for a second session, which began after a short pause in
which they could not communicate. The first and the second
session of experiment III were identical with experiment II. The
same is true for the first session of experiment IV, but not for the
second one. There, first, sufficiently many features are intro-
duced, to induce some familiarity with the structure of the
environment. Then, 36 new combinations of three features
(shapes, inserts, and colors) are presented in blocks of six and
selected for communication just once (Fig. 2). This ‘‘novelty’’
structure was explained to the subjects just before the beginning
of the second session. Also, in experiment III, subjects were not
informed about the conditions of the second session before the
end of the first one.
Results
The Impact of the Size of the Repertoire. In our first experiment (I),
only two (and then three) letters were permissible. After running
the experiment, we observed less convergence to common code
then we had expected. In the literature on language evolution
(22), it is common to emphasize the role of the human capability
to produce a great variety of phonetic signals for the develop-
ment of linguistic competence. Therefore, we supplied a larger
repertoire of permissible letters in all further experiments.
Table 1 reports results of experiments I on the one hand and
experiments II and the first sessions of III and IV on the other
hand. The latter three sessions are identical and can therefore be
pooled. We refer to them as the ‘‘pool.’’
The table shows in how many cases a common code was
reached. We say that a pair has reached a ‘‘common code’’ if the
codes of the two players for the last period agree with respect to
all figures chosen for communication in the course of the game.
(Because figures are chosen randomly, some of them may never
be chosen for a pair. Of course, one cannot expect code
agreement for such figures.)
As Fig. 1 shows, experiment I and the pool differ only with
respect to the size of the repertoire of the letters. This difference
is important for the emergence of a common code. This effect
is significant on the 10% level (P 0.069) according to a Fisher’s
+ +11-30 R,S(2) R,S (2),M,Z (3)
+ +
* * *
+
31-60 R,S(2),
Z(3)
R,S,V(2),
M,Z,F(3)
1-10 R,S(2) R,S(2)
figuresperiods letters: I
(cost)
1a Experiments I,II,II (session I), IV (session I)
letters:
II,III, IV
(cost)
figuresperiods letters (cost:2)
6 blocks of 6 figures.
The 3 shapes, 3 inserts, 3 colors 
introduced before: 
randomization of order within block
1-6
7-16
17-26
27-62
Z,H,N
Z,H,N, U,Y,T
Z,H,N, A,M,Q,J
Z,H,N,U,Y,T, 
A,M,Q,J
1b Experiment IV (session II)
Fig. 1. The experimental treatments.
Fig. 2. Figures in experiment IV’s second session.
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exact test, one-tailed. This suggests that a greater repertoire is in
fact facilitating the emergence of linguistic coordination.
From a logical point of view, two symbols are sufficient for the
construction of a code. In principle, communication could be
based on a binary code. However, it seems to be the case that the
availability of a sufficiently large variety of letters not only makes
it easier to achieve communication efficiency but also has a
cognitive effect that facilitates linguistic coordination. Later, in
connection with our discussion of grammars, we shall come back
to this point.
The Influence of Role Differentiation and Efficiency on Payoffs. In this
section, we restrict ourselves to the analysis of the pooled
experiments (II, and the first session of III and IV).We shall look
at rank correlations among a number of aggregate variables
defined for pairs as follows:
Agreement.Average number of figures with the same code for the
two players, over all periods.
Changes. The sum of all code changes for all periods. A code
change is a change of a message attached to a figure (e.g., if, in
a period, the messages for three figures are changed, this counts
as three code changes).
Asymmetry. The fraction of all code changes made by the player
with more code changes.
Code costs. The sum of code costs for all figures and both players
averaged over periods.
Payoff. The sum of all net payoffs for both players in all period.
Fig. 3 shows a graph whose nodes stand for the variables
defined above and whose edges indicate Spearman rank corre-
lations significant at least at the 1% level, one-tailed. The
number at an edge is the Spearman rank correlation coefficient
of the variables associated to the points connected by the edge.
A causal interpretation of Fig. 3 from left to right suggests
itself: code costs reflect the efficiency of coordination within a
pair. The higher the code cost, the lower its payoff. A high degree
of asymmetry results in few changes and much agreement.
Payoffs in turn are higher the more agreement and the fewer
changes there are. The negative correlation of changes and
agreement is a consequence of the common causal influence of
asymmetry.
Total asymmetry means that one of the players acts as the
leader (or the teacher) and the other as a follower who passively
adapts to the leader’s code. This role differentiation avoids
confusion by simultaneous changes: if, after a period, both
players adjust to the code of the other, differences in codes are
not reduced. Asymmetry ensures that any change reduces code
differences.
It is good for the payoff of the pair if they choose low-cost
codes and define asymmetric roles as early as possible. The two
factors seem to be independent: there is no significant correla-
tion between asymmetry and code cost, notwithstanding the
relatively high number of 57 observations.
Language Structure: Forms of Grammar. It is a further purpose of
this study to investigate factors affecting the structure of com-
mon codes. We distinguish between common codes with and
without a grammar. A code has a compositional grammar if it is
obtained by mapping instances of features to letters or strings of
letters, called graphemes, and by arranging them in a fixed order
of features. Thus, there may be two features, shapes and inserts,
two instances of ‘‘shape,’’ circle and triangle, and two instances
of ‘‘insert,’’ dot and cross. The compositional grammar shown in
Fig. 4 uses the graphemes ‘‘R’’ and ‘‘S’’ for circle and triangle,
and ‘‘M’’ and ‘‘Z’’ for dot and cross. In the fixed order, shape
precedes insert. Thus, our use of the word ‘‘compositional’’
conforms to the tradition that begins with Frege (23), according
to which a language is compositional when the meaning of a
changes
agreement
code cost
payoff
asymmetry
-.64
-.78
-.58
+.45
+.82
-.54
Fig. 3. Spearman rank correlations among aggregates for pairs significant at
least on the 1% level, one-tailed.
Table 1. Pairs reaching a common code in experiments I and
II–III–IV (pool)
Common code No common code
Pool 28 29
Experiment I 5 14
+ +
a list of 6 figures
R RM RZ
S SM SZ
none +
a compositional grammar
R RR RS
S SS SR
none +
a noncompositional grammar
R M SS
S RZ Z
none +
a nongrammatical code
Fig. 4. Types of code.
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complex expression can be derived uniquely from the meaning
of its constituents and the rules for combining them. This
definition survives in modern semantics (24).
One also finds noncompositional grammars and ungrammat-
ical codes in the data. Admittedly, we cannot offer an exact
general definition of the boundary line between these two
categories. We speak of a noncompositional grammar if a
principle suggests itself that generates the relationship.
The noncompositional grammar of Fig. 4 maps circles and
triangles to the letters ‘‘R’’ and ‘‘S,’’ respectively, and maps the
instances of inserts into the number of letters. Obviously,
the code has a regular structure but not a compositional one. The
nongrammatical code of Fig. 4 also follows a principle. The first
letter stands for the shape, a star is indicated by two equal letters,
and the cross by two different letters.
Of course, our concept of grammar does not capture the
intricacies of the use of the term in linguistics. It does not go
beyond what is called a ‘‘protolanguage’’ by Jackendoff (25) (i.e.,
a combination of linear order and semantic roles). However, it
is sufficient within the frame of our experiments.
Table 2 shows what kind of status, with respect to a common
code, pairs have achieved in the last period. As one can see, no
common code is reached in the majority of all cases. Among the
common codes, approximately two of three are ungrammatical.
Noncompositional grammars are rare, and grammars, if they are
present in the last period, tend to be compositional.
Extendability and the Persistence of Grammars. At the end of the
experiments, most grammars are compositional, but many non-
compositional grammars can be found at the end of block two.
In the course of our experiments (with the exception of the
second session of experiment IV), new figures and new letters
are introduced from one block to the next. The old figures
remain in the list, and new ones are added. We speak of an
‘‘extension’’ of an earlier code if the figures that were present
before are associated with the same messages as before. We say
that a common code of a pair at the end of block two is
‘‘persistent’’ if, at the end of block three, this pair has a common
code that is an extension of its earlier code.
Table 3 shows the persistence of different types of grammars
in the sessions of the pool. The compositional grammars are all
persistent, whereas all noncompositional ones are nonpersistent
(Fisher’s exact test yields a significance of 1%, two-tailed).
Moreover, all pairs with noncompositional grammars at the end
of block two have no grammar at the end of the session.
The results show that compositional grammars are easily
extendable, whereas the same is not true for noncompositional
grammars. The easy extendability of compositional grammars is
facilitated by the availability of one new letter for every new
instance of a feature. The extendability of compositional gram-
mars seems to be related to the concepts of productivity and
systematicity, usually associated to compositionality in the se-
mantic literature (26); however, we do not want to go into more
details in this respect here.
Actually, there is no necessity to use a different letter for every
instance of every feature. A fixed position for shapes, positions,
and colors has to be fixed anyhow, given the constraints of the
experiment. Thus, the same letter could be used for a circle, a
star, and blue. However, it seems to be very difficult for the
subjects to devise positional codes that rely heavily on positions
of letters to convey meaning. This is probably an important
reason why less common codes are found in experiment I, where
only one additional letter is made available for two new instances
of features in the transition from block two to block three.
Therefore, no compositional grammar was ever adopted by a
pair during experiment I. In this respect, it is interesting that a
full positional system of expressing numbers evolved only rela-
tively late in history (27). Less efficient systems like the roman
numbers lasted for a long time before positional notations were
introduced.
Emergence of Grammar in Response to Expressive Needs. An advan-
tage of grammar is the possibility to express new contents never
expressed before, but nevertheless having them understood by
other speakers of the same language. Bickerton (28) and Pinker
and Bloom (29) discuss this point from an evolutionary stand-
point (although from different perspectives). This advantage
counts in a sufficiently rich environment.
Experiment IV provides such an environment in the second
session. After introducing sufficiently many combinations of two
features, 36 new combinations of three features are presented
just once. This is explained in the instructions before the session
begins [see supporting information (SI) Text].
In the second session of experiment IV, only 5 of 17 pairs
developed grammars, all of them compositional, and reached
agreement soon after the beginning of the last phase.
Table 4 shows the average payoffs for pairs with and without
grammars in experiment IV’s second session. All five pairs
with grammar had higher payoffs than each of the 12 pairs
without grammar (theMann–WhitneyU test yields a significance
of 0.001 for this).
Compositional grammars are highly successful in the novelty-
providing environment of experiment IV and languages without
such grammars are far less successful. The relationships between
grammar and the expressive needs created by novelty are further
illustrated by the comparison between experiment III and ex-
periment IV.
The first sessions in experiment III and IV follow the same
rules. In experiment III, the same rules apply also to the second
session. The comparison of experiment III and IV aims at the
Table 2. Communication achievement of pairs in the last period
No common
code
Common code
Number of pairs,
all experimentsUngrammatical
Noncompositional
grammar
Compositional
grammar
66 (58%) 32 (28%) 1 (1%) 14 (12%) 113
In experiments III and IV, the two sessions are counted separately.
Table 3. Persistence of grammar types present at the end
of block two
Persistence No persistence
Compositional 5 0
Noncompositional 0 5
Table 4. Average payoff per pair in experiment IV,
second session
Pairs in IV, second session Average payoff
With grammar 635 talers
Without grammar 211 talers
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exclusion of mere experience effects as an explanation of the
emergence of grammars in the novelty treatment of the second
session of experiment IV.
At the end of the first session of both experiments III and IV,
subjects had to be reassigned to new pairs for the second session.
Thus, in comparing such experiments, we will consider indepen-
dent subject groups as a unit of observation (i.e., groups of
participants such that there is no matching across groups in the
first and second sessions).
We are primarily interested in numbers for the second session
because, there, a comparison of the effects of novelty and mere
repetition is possible. Fisher’s exact test yields a significance of
2%, one-tailed, for the four-field table for the second session
(Table 5, session 2). Significantly more groups with a grammar
emerge in the second session of the novelty condition. We can
exclude the possibility that the increase of the number of
grammars is due to a learning effect that should also be there in
the second session of the ‘‘repetitive’’ experiment III.
Discussion
Our experiments present a very simplistic and constrained envi-
ronment for the evolution of common codes. Nevertheless, the
results surprisingly reproduce many features of natural languages,
andmay throw light on interactive factors affecting the evolution of
a language. In the following, we discuss some broader implications
of our findings, which of course runs the risk of exaggerating the
transferability of our laboratory results to broader contexts.
(i) The size of the repertoire of elementary linguistic symbols
seems to be important in facilitating linguistic coordination. In
the experiments of Galantucci (21), there seems to be a high rate
of success in creating communication systems. We also find
successful coordination (although at somehow lower rates), but
our experiment I shows that a too small size of the repertoire may
be a serious obstacle for the attainment of a common code. This
is not only due to the fact that more symbols permit a higher
degree of cost efficiency by shorter expressions but also to some
properties of the human cognitive system. If the number of
elementary symbols is too small, one has to rely more on
positional structure. Positional systems of expressing meaning,
like in the Arabic number notation, are hard to devise for the
human mind, although they can be easily used once they are
available, as shown by the history of mathematics.
(ii) In an environment in which the same messages occur many
times, cost efficiency and role asymmetry are factors enhancing
communicative success, whereas grammars do not offer partic-
ular advantages under such circumstances. Role asymmetry
between a leader and an imitator avoids mismatches by simul-
taneous adjustments to the code of the other. In dialogue theory
(19), the role of imitation is also emphasized as conductive to the
conversational alignment of interlocutors. Our results throw
additional light on this phenomenon and suggest looking more
closely to how role asymmetry might facilitate alignment pro-
cesses. The importance of role asymmetry (30) is clearly visible
in the experiment despite the fact that there are no natural or
social status differences among the subjects. In natural language
transmission contexts (e.g., from parents to children, from
natives to immigrants), such status differences are pervasive.
(iii) In stable environments as those considered in point ii,
grammar does not matter much, and efficient arbitrary codes
often do better. However, compositional grammars have the
advantage of being more easily extendable to broader environ-
mental demands. Noncompositional grammars are more fragile
and are easily lost if new conditions have to be met.
(iv) In an environment with novelty, in the sense that often the
need arises to express something that never has been expressed
before, compositional grammars offer considerable coordination
advantages. Therefore, under such circumstances, compositional
grammars are more likely to arise. In this respect, our findings
parallel and complement hypotheses proposed in the literature on
language evolution (28, 29). In our experiments, all subjects have
grammatical competence but they make relatively little use of it
unless pressure of novelty gives them an incentive to do so.
Methods
In our experiments, the subjects sit at computer terminals and
cannot communicate verbally with each other. The interaction is
anonymous and only by formal messages. Subjects are randomly
paired at the beginning of a session and the pairs remain the same
for all periods of the session. During a session, the subjects in a pair
always interact only with each other. We now shortly explain the
general features common to all of our experiments. Detailed
instructions to subjects are reported in the SI Text.
Players. There are two players.
Periods. The experiment runs over 60 (or 62) periods.
Figures. In every period, each of the two players sees the same
figures on the screen, listed in different random order.
Structure of Figures. Figures have shapes, inserts, and, in one
experiment, colors. These ‘‘features’’ have different ‘‘instances’’
(shapes: circles, squares, etc; inserts: dots, crosses, etc.; colors: red,
yellow, etc.).
Codes. In every period, each of the two players has the same
repertoire of permissible letters (e.g., ‘‘R,’’ ‘‘S,’’ and ‘‘T’’) to be
used in messages that take the form of strings of permissible
letters. Each player has to fix a code assigning a message to every
figure. The code can be changed in every period.
Communication. In every period, one player, the sender, and a
figure are randomly chosen. The message corresponding to this
figure in the code of the sender is transferred to the other player,
the receiver. The message is understood if the codes of the
sender and the receiver agree with respect to the message
assigned to the chosen figure.
Period Payoff. Each player receives 10 units of the experimental
currency (taler), if the message has been understood, and zero
talers otherwise.However, the sender bears the cost of themessage,
composed of costs for each letter in the string. The costs of letters
(e.g., three talers for ‘‘R’’ and two talers for ‘‘S’’ and ‘‘T’’) do not
change over time and are known to the players when they fix their
codes.
Feedback. After each period, both players are informed about
whether the message was understood. If the message was not
understood, feedback is supplied to the receiver about the chosen
figure and to the sender about the message attached to the figure
in the receiver code.
The experiments were run at the Experimental Economics
Laboratory of TrentoUniversity (Trento, Italy). In an experimental
Table 5. Code structure by independent groups, experiments
III and IV
With grammar Without grammar
First session
Experiment III 2 7
Experiment IV 1 5
Second session
Experiment III 1 8
Experiment IV 4 2
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session, 34–40 participants were organized in fixed pairs interacting
anonymously by computer terminals. Communication was re-
stricted to the exchange of formal messages according to the rules.
An experiment lasted 1–2.5 h. Subjects received monetary payoffs
proportional to their earnings in talers. The conversion ratewas two
euro cents per taler, plus a fixed sum of five euros for their
participation.
Marco Tecilla gave invaluable help writing the code of the experi-
mental software. Phil Johnson-Laird provided helpful comments. We
thank the Rovereto Cognitive Science Laboratory and the Trento
Computable and Experimental Economics Laboratory for their or-
ganizational and financial support in running the experiments. Min-
istero dell’Universita` e della Ricerca Grant 2005139342 and Fondo per
gli Investimenti della Ricerca di Base Grant RBNE03A9A7 contrib-
uted to the project funding.
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